The Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) is currently updating the results of the last election, held on September 20. But with 95% of electoral constituencies already scrutinised it is clear that the southern African republic will soon change its leadership. After a twenty-years long hegemony of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), the incumbent Rupiah Banda is ready to bid farewell to the country and make room to the leader of the Patriotic Front (PF), Michael Sata. King Cobra, as Sata is often nicknamed, is not a novice to Zambian politics. A long-serving politician under Kaunda’s post-independence governments, the 75 years old leader joined the MMD in 1991, when plural politics was reintroduced in Zambia. Ten years later, in 2001, he left the MMD and founded the PF, running for presidency in 2001, 2006 and 2008. In the last two occasions, he lost by a narrow margin.
Despite early rumours indicating Banda as the favourite candidate Sata’s victory comes as no surprise. The MMD has proven incapable to address the discontent of the urban proletariat and lost thrust after the death of its leader Levy Mwanawasa in 2006. As suggested by a comparison of the two main parties’ manifestos, the PF seems better equipped to tackle Zambia’s economic and social problems. Traditionally campaigning on a strong anti-Chinese (and broadly anti-foreigners) stance, the PF had the merit to reinvigorate an anaemic political debate and to point straight at the major issues of the Zambian economy: an excessive dependency on copper; the government’s inability to extract tax rents from foreign-owned mines; the lack of value-added in the mineral industry.
King Cobra, a Laclauian populist for Larmer and Fraser, was able to convince the electorate that he would defend the interest of “the people” against a corrupt “power” represented by the alliance between the MMD and international corporations. While he (wisely) softened his anti-Chinese rhetoric in the last year, he succeeded in cultivating an image of “man of action” and advocate of the people. His victory is even more momentous considering that it came in spite of the crumbling of his alliance with the third major Zambian party, the liberal UPND.
The populist strategy of the PF does not fully reveal the complexity of the Party’s electoral basis. As Simutanyi explains, remarkable showings in Bemba-speaking regions of Luapula and Northern Province indicate that the PF “may have both ethnic and class bases”. As argued by Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, “the ability of Michael Sata to mobilize a diverse support base – by employing a ‘populist’ message in urban areas at the same time as receiving the support of his ethno-regional community in rural areas – lays bare the complexity of party strategies”. It will be interesting to see how this dual electoral base will reflect on the policies of the new administration.
If anything, Zambian 2011 election was a democratic success. The ECZ delivered results in a reasonably short time (albeit slightly behind schedule) which helped to prevent an explosion of rage by Sata’s supporters. The PF programme includes a reform of the ECZ that would subtract the appointment of its member from the president and confer it to the parliament. If enacted, this would further strengthen the functioning of Zambian democracy.
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Cheeseman, N., Hinfelaar, M., 2009. Parties, Platforms, and Political Mobilization: The Zambian Presidential Election of 2008. African Affairs, 109(434): 51–76.
Laclau, E., 2005. On Populist Reason. London: Verso.
Larmer, M., Fraser, A., 2007. Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia’s 2006 Elections. African Afairs, 106(425): 611-637.
Simutanyi, N., 2009. MMD’s Narrow Electoral Victory. Zambian Analysis 3(1).
Click here to read my article on Zambian 2011 election for PeaceReporter (in Italian).
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